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MOORE’S POTENTIAL 
June Carbone* & Naomi Cahn** 
INTRODUCTION 
Underlying the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland1 are long-term changes in the relationship between the family 
and the state.  These changes upended the reciprocities between the state 
definition of legitimate families and the basis for claims of state recognition 
and support.  Today, in contrast, many view the determination of what 
constitutes a family as a matter of personal self-definition to which the state 
should defer, producing even greater division in the relationship between 
families—however they are defined—and claims to state support. 
These issues have become the subject of an intense culture war.2  On the 
one hand, conservatives continue to view married, gendered, two-parent 
families as essential to societal well-being; thus, they favor traditional 
family values in the public square and the provision of state support to 
families only in the context of shared community values.3  Liberals, in 
contrast, emphasize tolerance in the public square and promote greater state 
support for all children regardless of family structure, viewing it as 
necessary to realizing the promises of equality and participatory citizenship 
in a democracy.4 
The Supreme Court decided Moore before the modern cultural divide on 
the structure of the family fully took hold; thus, Moore’s various opinions 
do not directly address this culture divide.  Yet, in two critical parts of the 
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 1. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 2. See NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES:  LEGAL 
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 1 (2010). 
 3. Scholars term this system, which treats gendered, two-parent marriages as critical to 
children’s support, as the privatization of dependency. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON 
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY 
TRAGEDIES 161–62 (1995). 
 4. See June Carbone, “Blue” Morality and the Legitimacy of the State—Ed Rubin’s 
Soul, Self, and Society:  The New Morality and the Modern State, LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
(Aug. 25, 2016) (reviewing EDWARD L. RUBIN, SOUL, SELF, AND SOCIETY:  THE NEW 
MORALITY AND THE MODERN STATE (2015)), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ 
lsi.12223/full [https://perma.cc/7AUL-SC6J]. 
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decision, the Court seemed to have anticipated this culture conflict, 
foreshadowing the tension between the growing desire of individuals to 
define “family” in terms of their own choosing and the state’s power to 
define what constitutes a legitimate family form and, thus, to decide who is 
entitled to state support. 
First, in granting Inez Moore a constitutional right to live with a family 
that included both of her grandchildren, the plurality based its decision on 
tradition, not autonomy.5  At the time, judicial conservatives had not yet 
hijacked tradition as support for constitutional originalism and judicial 
liberals had not yet unequivocally embraced individual choice as a source 
of protection for alternative families.  Thus, Moore is a methodologically 
conservative opinion that celebrates the traditional institution of the family 
through the vehicle of a grandmother-headed extended family.  In this 
sense, Moore has much in common with Obergefell v. Hodges,6 which 
reconciled an alternative family with mainstream institutions.7 
Second, while embracing Moore’s extended family as part of a 
longstanding tradition, Moore only narrowly accords recognition to the 
“traditional family” in this extended family form as entitled to 
constitutional protection.8  Instead, the various opinions saw this particular 
family structure as a fallback option that served as a privatized form of 
insurance to provide for children in times of financial or other family 
stress.9  Notably, none of the opinions discuss the circumstances that led to 
the grandchildren’s residence with their grandmother, other than noting the 
death of one of the children’s mothers.10  Rather, the case honors a worthy 
individual—a grandmother who takes in her multiple grandchildren—
without fully exploring the relationship between family and economic well-
being in the changing American landscape.  Thus, while crafting an opinion 
that does not challenge the deference due to land use decisions, the Justices 
also avoided laying a foundation for alternative families to claim state 
support in either practical or doctrinal terms. 
At the time of the decision, single-family zoning restrictions, which 
might not have been controversial in other eras, were emerging as markers 
of race and class and were facing mounting legal challenges.11  Today, 
studies indicate that racially and economically integrated communities tend 
to enhance the well-being and achievement of poor families without 
undermining those who are better off.12  Yet, local zoning laws, particularly 
 
 5. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 504–06. 
 6. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 7. Id. at 2595–96. 
 8. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503–05. 
 9. See id. at 505. 
 10. Id. at 496–97. 
 11. See, e.g., S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 
(N.J. 1975). 
 12. See, e.g., Raj Chetty & Nathaniel Hendren, The Impacts of Neighborhoods on 
Intergenerational Mobility:  Childhood Exposure Effects and County-Level Estimates 73 
(May 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hendren/files/nbhds_ 
paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/UC44-8XCQ]. 
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when tied to family characteristics, tend to encourage racial and financial 
segregation, compounding the disadvantages of poor communities of 
color.13  In particular, these laws give every community an incentive to 
adopt zoning restrictions that attract stable, higher-income families and 
exclude those likely to be poorer, needier, and a drain on community 
desirability or resources.14  In the face of the widespread adoption of such 
exclusionary practices, communities that adopt broader definitions of 
acceptable households may find themselves at a disadvantage in sustaining 
an appropriate mix of households.  Thus, East Cleveland, a heavily African 
American community struggling to maintain its middle-class status, adopted 
the zoning laws at issue in Moore in an effort to stave off a downward cycle 
in the community’s fortunes.15  The opinions in Moore, however, never 
acknowledged this community dynamic at work. 
Part I of this Article briefly explores the culture wars that have consumed 
American politics since Moore.  Part II discusses Moore’s uneasy position 
within the conception of family as a matter of choice versus tradition.  
Then, to the extent that the Moore Court addressed the changing family, 
Part III shows how it did so by treating the extended family as a 
manifestation of traditional family values, not the newly emerging 
substantive family values that valorize delay in childbearing and financial 
independence.16  Finally, Part IV considers Moore’s missed opportunities to 
examine the relationship between family form, race, and class. 
I.  CULTURE WARS REVISITED 
Scholars routinely describe American politics—and the disputes about 
family values—as a culture war.17  While there is no popularly accepted 
definition of what that culture war is about, it certainly includes differences 
about the source of moral values,18 the increasing ideological identification 
of American political parties,19 deeply rooted personality differences in 
 
 13. See generally J. Peter Byrne, Are the Suburbs Unconstitutional?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2265 
(1997) (reviewing CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE:  RACE, SPACE, AND 
AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996), and DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN:  RACE, HOUSING, AND THE 
SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995)). 
 14. See id. at 2269 (describing the social and economic incentives for exclusionary 
zoning as “the political independence of suburban jurisdictions, the near-complete delegation 
of zoning power by the state to the locality, the reliance on local taxes to fund local 
government services (particularly education), and national policies facilitating and 
subsidizing suburban development on a scale never undertaken before”). 
 15. See Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 389. 
 16. The authors term this distinction as red versus blue family values. See generally 
CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2. 
 17. See infra notes 18–22 and accompanying text. 
 18. See generally RUBIN, supra note 4. 
 19. See John T. Jost, The End of the End of Ideology, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 651, 654 
(2006). 
2592 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
values orientation,20 differences in forms of expression,21 and the role of the 
family in civic life.22 
However the culture wars are defined, the family has been a central part 
of that dispute, which can be described as a clash between “red” versus 
“blue” family values—or, more generally, as part of a traditionalist versus 
modernist cultural divide.  At the core of the divide are two different 
worldviews with overlapping political and family consequences.  The blue 
system combines “public tolerance with private discipline.”23  In this 
modernist system, people choose individually crafted values, central to self-
definition and personal self-worth.24  In contrast, the red system advocates 
public orthodoxy and private forgiveness.25  In this traditionalist system, 
values must be externally derived—from God, from authority grounded in 
tradition, or from human nature—to have meaning, and they should 
accordingly be upheld in the public square.26  Repentance, forgiveness, and 
reconciliation with the community occur in private.27 
The differences between these two systems have implications for both 
legal justifications and content.  Blue legal justifications uphold individual 
choice; red justifications look to sources of value outside the individual, 
such as tradition, authority, or community consensus.28  In terms of content, 
blue analysis favors a functional approach that looks at the importance of 
family roles, while red analysis favors time-honored definitions of family 
regularity.29  Thus, blue analysis is less tied to either continuity or 
institutional regularity.30 
Using these differing approaches, one can evaluate the family 
transformations in the latter part of the twentieth century.  Values about 
family form changed from a uniform emphasis on the necessity of 
heterosexual marriage (i.e., the traditionalist red system) to the acceptability 
of alternative family forms (i.e., the modernist blue system).31  At the same 
time, the pathways into the middle class changed from shepherding couples 
into early marriages to encouraging lengthy delays in family formation that 
better prepared parents for the responsibilities of family life.32  The process 
 
 20. See DONALD BRAMAN ET AL., CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCH., 
THE SECOND NATIONAL RISK AND CULTURE STUDY:  MAKING SENSE OF—AND PROGRESS 
IN—THE AMERICAN CULTURE WAR OF FACT 16 (2007). 
 21. See GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!:  KNOW YOUR VALUES AND 
FRAME THE DEBATE 1–29 (2014); GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS:  HOW LIBERALS AND 
CONSERVATIVES THINK 143–52 (2d ed. 2002). 
 22. See generally CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2. 
 23. See id. at 3–4. 
 24. See id. at 44. 
 25. See Carbone, supra note 4, at 4–5. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. at 16. 
 28. See id. at 2 n.1. 
 29. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2, at 6–7. 
 30. Compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015) (plurality opinion) 
(accepting changes over time in the meaning of marriage), with id. at 2612–16 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (treating marriage as an unchanging, time-honored system). 
 31. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2, at 33–46. 
 32. See id. 
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of transformation and the conflicts between the two systems exacerbate 
racial and class differences33 and frame the perspectives that underlie 
Moore. 
II.  CHOICE VERSUS TRADITION AS A SOURCE OF VALUES 
The facts of Moore are straightforward.  Sixty-three-year-old Inez Moore 
shared her home with her adult son, Dale Sr., and her two young 
grandchildren, Dale Jr. and John Jr.34  Six years after John Jr. came to live 
with his grandmother following his mother’s death, the City of East 
Cleveland prosecuted Moore for violating the city’s single-family zoning 
ordinance.35  The Ohio state courts upheld the conviction, but the U.S. 
Supreme Court struck down the ordinance in what should have been a 
relatively easy decision, given the harshness of the impact on a sympathetic 
grandmother.36  Nonetheless, the result sharply divided the Court and 
obscured the case’s broader significance for the legal recognition of 
families and for the interactions among race, class, and family orthodoxy. 
The Supreme Court declared the ordinance unconstitutional on its face 
but only by a vote of five to four and with disagreement among the five 
Justices in the majority on the basis for doing so.  In total, the Justices filed 
six separate opinions.  This part focuses on three of those opinions:  (1) 
Justice John Paul Stevens’s concurring opinion, (2) Justice Lewis Powell’s 
plurality opinion, and (3) Justice Potter Stewart’s dissenting opinion. 
A.  Justice Stevens’s Concurrence 
Writing only for himself, Justice Stevens issued the most far-reaching 
opinion, concurring only in the judgment.37  While his concurrence is 
viewed as idiosyncratic, Stevens may well have anticipated later judicial 
developments in his desire to avoid a publicly imposed definition of family.  
Unlike any of the other Justices, Stevens described the case as one that 
started with Moore’s choice of how to constitute her family.  He thus 
framed the case in terms of the arbitrariness of the ordinance, observing that 
the “city has failed totally to explain the need for a rule that would allow a 
homeowner to have two grandchildren live with her if they are brothers but 
not if they are cousins.”38  In emphasizing Moore’s ability to choose her 
family form, however, Stevens faced a dilemma:  if Moore could define 
family in whatever terms she chooses, it would be hard to associate her 
 
 33. See generally id. 
 34. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 496 (1977). 
 35. Id. at 497.  John Jr., who was ten years old by the time the Supreme Court decided 
the case, had lived with his grandmother since his mother died when he was less than a year 
old, and his father, John Sr., apparently lived with the family as well. Id. at 497 n.4; see Brief 
for Appellant at 4, Moore, 431 U.S. 494 (No. 75-6289), 1976 WL 178722, at *4. 
 36. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 507 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he zoning power is not a 
license for local communities to enact senseless and arbitrary restrictions which cut deeply 
into private areas of protected family life.”). 
 37. See id. at 513–21 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 38. Id. at 520–21. 
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particular definition of family with constitutional protection.  Stevens 
skirted this issue by according Moore constitutional protection as a 
homeowner, rather than on the basis of her family form.39  Stevens wrote 
that Moore’s interest in her ability to live with both grandsons was 
particularly important with respect to a rule that cuts “deeply into a 
fundamental right normally associated with the ownership of residential 
property—that of an owner to decide who may reside on his or her 
property.”40 
Stevens’s decision not to define the “family” that is entitled to 
constitutional protection encouraged him to take on an issue the other 
Justices in the majority wished to avoid:  the standard of deference due to 
state zoning decisions.41  The Moore dissent, much like the Supreme 
Court’s 1974 decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,42 accorded such 
ordinances substantial deference, requiring only a rational relationship to a 
permissible state objective.43  In contrast, Stevens wrote that, because the 
ordinance 
ha[d] not been shown to have any “substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare” of the city of East Cleveland, 
and . . . [because] it must fall under [this Court’s] limited standard of 
review of zoning decisions[,] . . . East Cleveland’s unprecedented 
ordinance constitutes a taking of property without due process and 
without just compensation.44 
Such a standard—requiring a showing of a “substantial” rather than a 
“rational” relationship between a zoning regulation and public policy 
concerns—would have substantially increased the scrutiny applicable to 
local zoning ordinances that infringed on property owners’ associational 
rights.  By tying his decision to the Takings Clause of the Constitution, 
Stevens did not depend on a particular construction of the constitutional 
rights accorded families.  Instead, Stevens emphasized that the state had a 
legitimate interest in regulating “the identity, as opposed to the number, of 
persons who may compose a household only to the extent that the 
ordinances require such households to remain nontransient, single-
housekeeping units.”45  Had his opinion been the majority, it would have 
provided the basis for challenging restrictive zoning provisions throughout 
the country, in effect limiting, though not necessarily overturning, the 
Court’s decision in Belle Terre, which upheld a similar single family zoning 
restriction as it applied to unrelated individuals.46  The ordinance in Belle 
Terre appeared to be aimed primarily at restricting the number of college 
 
 39. Id. at 520. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 519–21. 
 42. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
 43. Moore, 431 U.S. at 538–39 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 44. Id. at 520–21 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 45. Id. at 519. 
 46. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 1. 
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students in the area;47 it would not have prevented Moore from living with 
her grandsons.48 
B.  Justice Powell’s Plurality Opinion 
In contrast, Justice Powell, joined by three other Justices, wrote a 
plurality opinion emphasizing the constitutional protection afforded 
families49 and grounding the definition of “families” in tradition.50  In 
subjecting the East Cleveland ordinance to greater scrutiny than that 
associated with a rational relationship test, the plurality shifted its emphasis 
away from property rights, where it viewed a rational relationship test as 
appropriate, and toward the intrusion on family.51  The Court observed that 
East Cleveland “has chosen to regulate the occupancy of its housing by 
slicing deeply into the family itself,”52 making it “a crime of a 
grandmother’s choice to live with her grandson in circumstances like those 
presented” in the case.53  The plurality opinion thus based its analysis on 
the Due Process Clause, holding that the “Court has long recognized that 
freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of 
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”54  In turn, this analysis required the Court to provide a 
definition of the family to be accorded constitutional protection; the 
plurality adopted a conservative definition.55 
In articulating a notion of the family that justified constitutional 
protection, the plurality looked to tradition and observed that the extended 
family was at least as deeply rooted in tradition as the nuclear family, if not 
more so.56  The nuclear family, in contrast, was a recent development.57  
The plurality then noted that “[e]ven if conditions of modern society have 
brought about a decline in extended family households,”58 it remains true 
that “[t]he tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents 
sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally 
venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.”59  The 
opinion found this tradition in “the accumulated wisdom of civilization, 
gained over the centuries and honored throughout our history, that supports 
a larger conception of the family.”60  The Justices thus treated as 
 
 47. See id. 
 48. Moore, 431 U.S. at 519 n.15 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 49. See generally Brief for Appellant, supra note 35. 
 50. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503–05 (plurality opinion). 
 51. Id. at 498–500. 
 52. Id. at 498. 
 53. Id. at 499. 
 54. Id. (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974)). 
 55. Id. at 505. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 504. 
 60. Id. at 505.  As a matter of constitutional jurisprudence, Moore and Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), are based on similar views of how to find the traditions 
protected by the Due Process Clause. 
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commonplace the recognition of extended relatives as family and viewed 
the grandmother’s actions in taking in both of her grandchildren as 
admirable.  In doing so, the plurality adopted a normative vision of the 
family entitled to constitutional protection—a fundamentally different 
approach from Stevens’s modernist embrace of choice.  Accordingly, the 
Court acknowledged that affording constitutional protection to families 
required providing a substantive definition of what constituted a family.61  
Moreover, the plurality did not question the ability of governmental 
authorities to define what they meant by family; the opinion simply 
required that the definition accept families determined by blood, adoption, 
and marriage. 
C.  Justice Stewart’s Dissent 
Justice Stewart’s dissent, joined by Justice William Rehnquist, sought 
both to narrow the definition of the family and to limit the constitutional 
protection accorded to such families.62  In doing so, it turned the plurality’s 
emphasis of the result’s arbitrariness on its head.  Stewart wrote that the 
interest that the appellant may have in permanently sharing a single 
kitchen and a suite of contiguous rooms with some of her relatives simply 
does not rise [to the level of a constitutionally protected interest].  To 
equate this interest with the fundamental decisions to marry and to bear 
and raise children is to extend the limited substantive contours of the Due 
Process Clause beyond recognition.63 
Stewart’s belittling comments, which assumed that Moore could simply 
have some of the family live in the other dwelling unit she owned in the 
same building,64 suggested that Stevens’s associational interests were not 
worthy of constitutional protection and that Moore’s choices about which 
relatives to invite into her residence had nothing to do with the definition of 
a constitutionally protected family.65  In short, the Constitution did not 
protect “choice” in the modernist sense at all. 
A fuller embrace of the idea of choice would come decades in the future.  
Consider, as a point in contrast, Justice Kennedy’s opening paragraph in 
Lawrence v. Texas,66 which struck down a statute criminalizing same-sex 
sodomy.  Justice Kennedy wrote: 
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, 
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.  The instant case involves 
liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent 
dimensions.67 
 
 61. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503–05. 
 62. Id. at 531–41 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. at 537. 
 64. Id. at 533 & n.4. 
 65. Id. at 537. 
 66. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 67. Id. at 562. 
2017] MOORE’S POTENTIAL 2597 
Justice Stevens’s concurrence would be as close as the Moore Court would 
come to the modernist embrace of an individual right of self-definition.68 
III.  MOORE AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
FAMILY TRANSFORMATION 
The Moore opinion, in addition to its refusal to embrace the rhetoric of 
family choice, also skirted the substantive family transformation that was 
taking place in the latter part of the twentieth century.  That transformation 
involved a shift from marriage as part of a universal transition from 
adolescence into adulthood to family formation as a choice best made by 
those who have attained emotional maturity and financial independence.69  
The change required an embrace of contraception and, if necessary, 
abortion as critical to the postponement of childbearing, greater acceptance 
of nonmarital sexuality, and the redefinition of what had been gendered 
family roles.70 
Moore could have been cast in such terms.  Doing so, however, would 
have required shifting the focus from the grandmother, who is sympathetic 
under any definition of family values, to her two sons, the fathers of her 
grandchildren.  We know relatively little about the sons.  We know that the 
first son, Dale Sr., and his child, Dale Jr., were living with Moore before the 
case arose.71  Only when the second grandson, John Jr., joined the 
household did the family violate the East Cleveland ordinance.72  John Jr. 
came to live with Moore when his mother died.73  The opinion, however, 
tells us nothing about the circumstances.  These issues are irrelevant to the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Moore—the Court addressed only the 
application of the East Cleveland ordinance to the grandmother’s decision 
to live with both of her grandchildren. 
Instead, Moore ties the extended family to a tradition that privatizes 
family support.  Moore is a homeowner, and there was no indication that 
she received public benefits to care for her grandchildren.  When her sons 
needed assistance with the care of their children, whether because of John 
Jr.’s mother’s death or their own financial needs, they turned to a family 
member—not the state—for assistance.  These factors make Moore part of a 
long-standing tradition of neoliberal family support, and the Justices who 
join in the plurality opinion championing Moore’s position do so in 
precisely these terms. 
 
 68. The question of whether the Supreme Court has ever embraced a modernist 
definition of family formation as a matter of individual expression is complex.  For critiques 
of Lawrence, which unmoors its analysis from blood, marriage, and adoptions but still relies 
on traditionalist tropes of what an intimate relationship constitutes, see Katherine M. Franke, 
The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004). 
 69. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2, at 20–22. 
 70. Id. at 19–46. 
 71. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 533 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. at 496–97 (plurality opinion). 
 73. Id. 
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Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, had grounded constitutional 
protection of the family in its deep roots “in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.”74  He acknowledged that extended families had become less 
likely to live together but emphasized that they still came together in times 
of need.75  He treated the extended family as a fallback option, a form of 
insurance policy designed to protect the children from the failings of their 
parents.  This reasoning thus broke little new ground in the definition of the 
family. 
Justice William Brennan filed a concurrence, together with Justice 
Thurgood Marshall, that went further than the plurality in acknowledging 
the roots of family diversity.  The concurrence agreed with the plurality that 
the ordinance impermissibly infringed upon Moore’s choice of what 
constituted family and that the plurality’s acceptance of the extended family 
by blood had deeply embedded roots.76  Brennan, however, emphasized that 
the East Cleveland ordinance displayed “a depressing insensitivity toward 
the economic and emotional needs of a very large part of our society.”77  
Brennan’s concurrence linked the extended family to generations of 
immigrant families and to class and racial differences, noting: 
Even in husband and wife households, 13% of black families compared 
with 3% of white families include relatives under 18 years old, in addition 
to the couple’s own children.  In black households whose head is an 
elderly woman, as in this case, the contrast is even more striking:  48% of 
such black households, compared with 10% of counterpart white 
households, include related minor children not offspring of the head of the 
household.78 
The concurrence thus saw the East Cleveland ordinance as arbitrarily 
refusing to recognize not only a long-established family form but also a 
family form associated with poor and minority families and of continuing 
importance to those experiencing financial stress.79  In short, the extended 
family is a consequence of compulsion rather than choice, and the 
conclusion of both the plurality opinion and the concurrence is that the 
ordinance is arbitrary, if not counterproductive.  The plurality, by grounding 
its analysis in tradition, could accordingly strike it down without 
 
 74. Id. at 503. 
 75. Id. at 505. 
 76. Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 77. Id. at 508. 
 78. Id. at 509–10; see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 35, at 12. 
 79. Indeed, Brennan’s concurrence, which went further than the other opinions in 
endorsing the benefits of extended families, also saw extended families as a consequence of 
economic stress, observing: 
The “extended family” that provided generations of early Americans with social 
services and economic and emotional support in times of hardship, and was the 
beachhead for successive waves of immigrants who populated our cities, remains 
not merely still a pervasive living pattern, but under the goad of brutal economic 
necessity, a prominent pattern—virtually a means of survival—for large numbers 
of the poor and deprived minorities of our society.  For them compelled pooling of 
scant resources requires compelled sharing of a household. 
Id. at 508. 
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influencing either the likely course of family evolution or the patterns of 
racial and economic segregation that affect American cities. 
The four dissenting Justices also faced a dilemma.  They, too, should 
have viewed Moore approvingly.  Yet, they wanted to preserve the ability 
of zoning boards to reinforce the links between property values and 
mainstream families, however the particular community defined them.  
They therefore did not want to address the definition of family at all.80  
These opinions, while sharing Stevens’s determination not to embed a 
definition of family in the Constitution, disagreed with his expansion of the 
constitutional rights of homeowners vis-à-vis the state and thus sought ways 
to allow the Court to look the other way.81 
The multiple opinions in Moore, while disagreeing sharply with each 
other in the framing of the issues and in their conclusions about the result, 
do not challenge the definition of what constitutes a family nor the ability of 
zoning authorities to define families and to channel82 appropriate residential 
behavior.  To the extent any of the opinions extended constitutional 
protection to families, they did so on the basis of blood ties rather than 
choice.83  The four Justices who joined the plurality opinion grounded their 
conclusion not only in tradition but also in the practicalities of a private 
system of family support.84  A grandmother who comes to the aid of her 
grandchildren, after all, vindicates both traditionalist and modernist family 
values.  Although Moore breaks new ground in protecting a grandmother 
from the vagaries of a local zoning ordinance, it does not fundamentally 
change the understandings of what constitutes a family—nor do much to 
restrict exclusionary zoning laws. 
IV.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY, CLASS, AND RACE:  
THE UNFINISHED DISCUSSION 
Moore is indubitably about the intersection of family, class, and race.  
Brennan’s concurrence observed that the nuclear family is a pattern 
associated with “white suburbia”85 and stressed that the “Constitution 
 
 80. Id. at 521–22 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that the right solution was for 
Moore to seek a variance from the local zoning officials). 
 81. See, e.g., id. at 550–51 (White, J., dissenting) (adopting a deferential standard of 
review toward zoning ordinances).  In fact, many states have dealt with exclusionary zoning 
provisions in exactly this way, keeping such restrictions on the books and then backing down 
only in the face of determined (or embarrassing) opposition.  Such challenges, though, may 
be beyond the reach of financially stressed extended families. See Kent W. Bartholomew, 
Comment, The Definition of “Family” in Missouri Local Zoning Ordinances:  An Analysis 
of the Justifications for Restrictive Definitions, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631, 665–66 (2008). 
 82. See generally June Carbone, Out of the Channel and into the Swamp:  How Family 
Law Fails in a New Era of Class Division, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859 (2011); Linda C. 
McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage:  Revisiting the Channelling Function of 
Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133 (2007); Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling 
Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992). 
 83. In this sense, Stevens’s opinion grounds its protection of Moore on her rights as a 
homeowner, not on a right extended to families per se. See supra Part II.A. 
 84. Moore, 431 U.S. at 505 (plurality opinion). 
 85. Id. at 508 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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cannot be interpreted . . . to tolerate the imposition by government upon the 
rest of us of white suburbia’s preference in patterns of family living.”86  It 
documented the dramatically greater association of extended families in 
African American communities than in white communities.  It also 
commented that this may reflect “the truism that black citizens, like 
generations of white immigrants before them, have been victims of 
economic and other disadvantages that would worsen if they were 
compelled to abandon extended, for nuclear, living patterns.”87 
None of the opinions acknowledge, however, the role of the changing 
family in exacerbating race and class disparities.  The plurality celebrated 
the traditional extended family without noting its association with 
marriage.88  In some communities, extended families permitted earlier 
marriages, with the new bride and groom moving in with their parents, or 
they contributed to the ability of working-class mothers to work outside the 
home or to care for elderly or disabled relatives.  And they have long served 
as the fallback helping to deal with the consequences of death or divorce.89 
By the late 1970s, however, extended families were also dealing with a 
national decline in marriage.90  Both better-off and poorer women had 
become more sexually active, and the importance of the shotgun marriage 
was decreasing for both.91  Ambitious women responded by embracing 
contraception and abortion, while working-class women became more 
likely to give birth without marrying.  Extended families, especially in 
African American communities, were associated with “matrifocal 
families.”92 
This created a dilemma for zoning boards.  East Cleveland was a 
predominately African American community, with an African American 
city manager and city commission.93  Robert Burt observed that “the 
purpose of the ordinance was quite straightforward:  to exclude from a 
middle-class, predominantly black community, that saw itself as socially 
and economically upwardly mobile, other black families most characteristic 
of lower-class ghetto life.”94  This purpose does not make sense if extended 
families simply served as fallback options for nuclear families experiencing 
hardships, such as the death of a child’s mother.  Instead, Burt emphasized 
that the problem with these extended families was not so much that they 
were multigenerational but that they were female headed and 
“disproportionately characteristic of black lower-income households.”95 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 509. 
 88. Id. at 503–06 (plurality opinion). 
 89. JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS:  THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY 
LAW (2000). 
 90. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2, at 19–32. 
 91. Id. at 34–37. 
 92. Burt, supra note 15, at 388. 
 93. Moore, 431 U.S. at 537 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 94. Burt, supra note 15, at 389. 
 95. Id. at 388. 
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By adopting this ordinance, East Cleveland thus sought to preserve its 
middle-class character, not its racial character.  Moore may also have been 
trying to preserve her family’s middle-class status by including her 
grandchildren in the home she owned in a better part of town than may have 
been available to her sons if they sought to live with their children on their 
own.  Justice Stewart dismisses the importance of Moore’s interest in living 
in East Cleveland, describing the city as “an area with a radius of three 
miles and a population of 40,000” and suggesting that Moore could move 
with her grandchildren to some other part of town.96  Yet, none of the 
opinions tell us how easy that would have been, given the racial 
composition of the rest of the area, or how easy it would have been for 
Moore to sell her home or find a similar house she could afford elsewhere.  
Moreover, moving would have almost certainly been disruptive for her and 
her grandchildren.97 
The fundamental socioeconomic question underlying the case involves 
the role of economic and racial segregation in limiting social mobility and 
compounding the effects that may be associated with family form.  Modern 
research indicates that, holding constant for other factors, some 
communities promote social mobility better than others.98  The 
communities that provide the greatest advantages have “lower rates of 
residential segregation by income and race, lower levels of income 
inequality, better schools, lower rates of violent crime, and a larger share of 
two-parent households.”99  Moreover, children who move from less-
advantaged to more-advantaged communities enjoy significant advantages 
even if their parents remain poor and they continue to live in single-parent 
families.100  Ironically, therefore, Moore had strong interests—to preserve 
the value of the property she owned and to provide a decent life for her 
grandchildren—in living in an area with more nuclear family households.  
And East Cleveland, in turn, best served Moore’s interests by allowing her 
to remain without (again, ironically) attracting many more families like 
hers.101 
Given these realities, neither the Supreme Court nor the City of East 
Cleveland nor Moore had any good options in addressing this issue, and 
none of the Moore opinions discuss the community effects underlying the 
case.  The dissents wished to affirm the validity of local zoning laws 
without acknowledging the role such ordinances play in promoting racial 
and economic segregation.  The plurality wished to affirm the legitimacy of 
extended family households without acknowledging that a concentration of 
 
 96. Moore, 431 U.S. at 550 (White, J., dissenting). 
 97. See William G. Austin, Relocation, Research, and Forensic Evaluation, Part I:  
Effects of Residential Mobility on Children of Divorce, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 137, 140 (2008) 
(demonstrating the harmful effects of residential mobility on children). 
 98. See generally CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2. 
 99. CHETTY & HENDREN, supra note 12, at 7. 
 100. Id. 
 101. This is true so long as extended families in fact serve the role, as described in Justice 
Brennan’s plurality opinion, of providing a privatized way of dealing with family stress. 
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single-parent families tends to undermine community well-being.102  Justice 
Stevens, in giving homeowners a right to association without tying it to 
constitutional protection for families, penned the most radically 
individualistic opinion, elevating property rights over community efforts to 
enhance property values.  Yet, it seems closer in spirit to objections to the 
exercise of the power of eminent domain103 than to cases like Lawrence that 
grant a right of intimate association.  Considered in retrospect, Moore 
stands as a common sense invalidation of an arbitrary definition of single 
family applied to produce unsupportable results in the case of a sympathetic 
grandmother.  It has not contributed, however, to any greater appreciation 
of how the constitution of families104 interacts with the constitution of 
communities to determine societal well-being. 
CONCLUSION 
In the years after Moore, the cultural, racial, and economic divisions 
centered on the family have increased.  A large number of states have struck 
down restrictive zoning measures based on family form, while a significant 
number of other states have refused to do so.105  In 1979, less-traditional 
families were still largely associated with race; today, they have 
increasingly also become a marker of class as poor and working-class white 
families have adopted some of the same practices.106  A number of states, 
such as California, override local zoning laws to ensure that all 
communities include affordable housing, while other states have allowed 
racial and economic segregation to become more entrenched.107 
Today, as much as in 1979, there is no agreement about whether the 
relationship between the constitution of family and the constitution of 
community should involve a red embrace of established values in the public 
square or a blue celebration of individual choice coupled with the 
construction of communities designed to support all of our children. 
 
 
 102. This may be true for many reasons, including their association with poverty. 
 103. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 104. See Burt, supra note 15. 
 105. See Katia Brener, Note, Belle Terre and Single-Family Home Ordinances:  Judicial 
Perceptions of Local Government and the Presumption of Validity, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 447, 
454 (1999). 
 106. See generally JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS:  HOW 
INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014); CHARLES MURRAY, COMING 
APART (2012). 
 107. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65580–65589.8 (West 2017) (requiring localities to meet 
their “fair share” of the need for housing at all income levels, specifically including the need 
for very low-, low-, and moderate-income housing); CHETTY & HENDREN, supra note 12 
(ranking municipalities in terms of their opportunities for social mobility). 
